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Recent Trends in Criminal Law Reform 
Gilles LÉTOURNEAU* 
Susan ZIMMERMAN** 
A review of recent legislative, judicial and administrative reforms in 
criminal matters shows an increased thrust toward greater fairness and 
efficiency of the criminal justice system. This has materialized in an in-
creased protection of individual rights, a renewed interest in diversion and 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, a streamlining of the process 
through court reform, caseflow management and a simplification of the 
criminal procedure and a greater openness to the use of new technology. 
Although contradictory at first sight, efficiency and fairness are two nec-
essary and complementary attributes of the criminal justice system. 
Les réformes législatives, judiciaires et administratives entreprises 
récemment en matière criminelle témoignent d'efforts croissants pour 
rendre le système de justice criminelle plus équitable et plus efficace. On a 
pu noter une protection accrue des droits individuels, un intérêt renouvelé 
pour la déjudiciarisation et pour les modes alternatifs de résolution des 
conflits ainsi qu'un effort de rationalisation du processus pénal qui s'est 
concrétisé par la réforme des tribunaux judiciaires, l'établissement d'une 
politique de gestion judiciaire des dossiers et la simplification de la pro-
cédure criminelle. De même, le système a fait preuve d'une plus grande 
ouverture à l'égard des nouvelles technologies. Même si, à première vue, 
les concepts d'équité et d'efficacité semblent s'opposer, ils constituent en 
fait deux attributs nécessaires et complémentaires du système de justice 
criminelle. 
* Q.C. President, Law Reform Commission of Canada. 
** Executive Assistant to the President of the Law Reform Commission of Canada. 
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The last few years have revealed two parallel trends in criminal law 
reform : one, toward an increased protection of the rights of the individual ; 
the other, toward a more efficient functioning of the criminal justice sys-
tem. The two trends have emerged through judicial, legislative and admin-
istrative reforms. 
This simultaneous thrust toward greater fairness and increased effi-
ciency may seem, at first glance, to be contradictory. How can a system 
concerned with promoting efficiency also ensure fairness ? In reviewing 
the elements of these recent reforms, it will appear that fairness and 
efficiency are not only not incompatible but in fact must go hand in hand in 
order for either set of reforms to be successful. 
1. Increased Protection of Individual Rights 
1.1 Rights of the Accused 
While the United States Supreme Court in some cases is backing away 
from the protection of individual rights in favour of increasing the law 
enforcement power of the state1, the Supreme Court of Canada, using the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, has been increasingly pro-
tecting the rights of the individual from undue encroachment by agents of 
1. For example, in Horton v. California, 110 S.Ct. 2301 (1990), the Court extended police 
powers of seizure by holding that inadvertence is not a requirement of the plain view 
doctrine. Justice Stevens found that the inadvertence requirement is not necessary to 
prevent searches from becoming general searches. 
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the state. Supreme Court decisions in the last two years alone show a 
consistent trend toward elaborating and strengthening the rights of the 
accused. 
In the case of R. v. Hebert2, the court addressed the following ques-
tion : where the police use deception to elicit a statement from an accused 
who has already expressly chosen not to speak to police, is the accused's 
right to silence, as protected by s. 7, violated ? The court ruled that it is, 
while at the same time the United States Supreme Court, backing away 
from its previous position, decided that there was no need for a formal 
warning in those circumstances under that country's Constitution3. 
The deciding factor for the Supreme Court of Canada was the fact that 
the police deliberately practised deception and actively elicited a statement 
from the accused rather than just observing him. This behaviour was 
exacerbated by the fact that the statement so elicited was the only evidence 
against the accused. The admission of this evidence would render the trial 
unfair because, as Madam Justice McLachlin put it, the accused was : 
conscripted to give evidence against himself after clearly electing not to do so by 
use of an unfair trick practised by the authorities, and where the resultant state-
ment is the only evidence against him, one must surely conclude that reception of 
the evidence would render the trial unfair4. 
Not only did the deceptive police practice violate the accused's right 
to silence, it could not be saved by s. 1. Most importantly, the evidence so 
obtained could not be used as part of the case against the accused because 
its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. 
A few months later, the Supreme Court fortified its protection of the 
right to silence in R. v. Chambers5. This case did not involve police 
procedure but rather, the conduct of the Crown at trial. 
The main issue before the Supreme Court was whether the trial judge 
had erred in allowing the Crown to cross-examine the accused as to why he 
did not make an exculpatory statement to the authorities upon his arrest or 
at any time prior to trial6. 
2. R. v. Hebert, (1990) 57 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.). 
3. Illinois v. Perkins. (1990) W.L. 71443 (U.S.S.C.). 
4. R. v. Hebert, supra, note 2, 44. 
5. R. v. Chambers, (1990) 59 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.). 
6. In fact, the trial judge, at the insistence of counsel for the defence, undertook to instruct 
the jury as to the very limited use they could make ofthat evidence. As a result ofthat 
undertaking, the defence did not lead evidence that the accused had indeed provided an 
exculpatory explanation of his actions to his own counsel long before the trial, which 
would have undermined the Crown's argument that the accused's defence was a « recent 
concoction ». In his charge to thejury, however, the trial judge failed to instruct them on 
this issue. 
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Cory J., speaking for a majority of the court (six of seven judges) noted 
that it is « well recognized that there is a right to silence which can properly 
be exercised by an accused person in the investigative stages of the pro-
ceedings7 ». 
The trial judge's failure to warn the jury against drawing an adverse 
inference from the accused's exercise of his right not to offer his defence to 
the authorities during their investigation caused « irreparable damage » to 
the defence. As there was no relevant basis for the Crown's questions in 
this area, they « were improper and the evidence inadmissible8 ». The court 
found there had been a serious miscarriage of justice and ordered a new 
trial. 
In order for accused persons to benefit from their right to make full 
answer and defence, the Supreme Court has ruled unanimously that the 
Crown has an obligation to disclose the fruits of its investigation9. What the 
Crown discovers in the course of its investigation is public property and is 
to be used not to secure a conviction, but to ensure that justice is done10. 
After a review of the pros and cons of disclosure by the Crown, Sopinka J. 
for the court concluded that « there is no valid practical reason to support 
the position of the opponents of a broad duty of disclosure11 ». He cited in 
particular the «overriding concern that failure to disclose impedes the 
ability of the accused to make full answer and defence12 ». 
The Supreme Court also manifested concern for the accused's right to 
make full answer and defence in R. v. Seaboyer13. The accused attacked 
the constitutionality of ss. 276-277 of the Criminal Code, the so-called rape 
shield provisions enacted in 1985. Section 276 prohibited a person accused 
of sexual assault from adducing evidence of the complainant's sexual 
activity with anyone other than the accused, subject only to three excep-
tions. Section 277 provided that evidence of sexual reputation is not ad-
missible for the purpose of challenging or supporting the complainant's 
credibility. The issue before the court was whether these restrictions 
offended guarantees afforded to the accused under the Charter, specifically 
under ss. 7 and 11(d) (the presumption of innocence). 
A minority of the court (two of nine judges) would have upheld both 
provisions. The majority, while agreeing that these provisions had « laud-
7. R. v. Chambers, supra, note 5, 340. 
8. Id., 342. 
9. R. v. Stinchcombe, (1991) 68 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.). 
10. id., 7. 
11. Id., 9. 
12. Ibid. 
13. R. v. Seaboyer, (1991) 66 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.). 
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able goals » (to avoid unprobative and misleading evidence, to encourage 
the reporting of sexual assault and to protect the security and privacy 
of witnesses), was concerned about their effect14. As Madam Justice 
McLachlin put it, writing for the majority : « The right of the innocent not to 
be convicted is dependent on the right to present full answer and de-
fence15. » 
The majority found that s. 277 (basing the complainant's credibility on 
sexual reputation) does not offend the Charter. After considering the 
defences that an accused might be precluded from making due to the 
restrictions in s. 276 however, the majority concluded that this provision 
infringes the rights in ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter and is not saved by s. 1. 
McLachlin J. stated : 
In achieving its purpose—the abolition of the outmoded, sexistbased use of 
sexual conduct evidence — it overshoots the mark and renders inadmissible evi-
dence which may be essential to the presentation of legitimate defences and hence 
to a fair trial. In exchange for the elimination of the possibility that the judge may 
draw illegitimate inferences from the evidence, it exacts as a price the real risk that 
an innocent person may be convicted. The price is too great in relation to the 
benefit secured, and cannot be tolerated in a society that does not countenance in 
any form the conviction of the innocent16. 
Later on, we shall see how the court's suggestions and the govern-
ment's subsequent draft legislation try to strike a balance between the 
rights of the accused and the protection of the complainant. 
The Supreme Court explored another aspect of the right of the accused 
to make full answer and defence (as protected by s. 7 of the Charter) in a 
series of cases17 dealing with access by an accused to the information on the 
basis of which a wiretap has been authorized. In Dersch, the court con-
sidered whether an accused is required to show prima facie misconduct by 
the party who applied for the wiretap authorization, in order to be granted 
access to the affidavit filed in support of the application. In effect, because 
the contents of the authorization packet are not accessible to the public, it 
was virtually impossible for an accused to demonstrate such misconduct. 
A majority of the court concluded that it is sufficient for an accused to 
assert that admission of the evidence obtained by wiretap is challenged and 
that access to the sealed authorization packet is required to permit full 
14. Id., 387. 
15. Id., 389. 
16. Id., 402. 
17. Dersch v. A.G. Canada, (1990) 60 C.C.C. (3d) 132 (S.C.C.) ; R. v. Garofoli, (1990) 60 
C.C.C. (3d) 161 (S.C.C); R. v. Zito, (1990) 60 C.C.C. (3d) 216 (S.C.C.) ; R. v. La-
chance, (1990) 60 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C). 
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answer and defence18. The rationale for this is that only on the basis of the 
information in the packet can an accused move to have the wiretap author-
ization set aside. 
Similarly, the court in Garofoli and Lachance loosened the restric-
tions on the ability of an accused to cross-examine the affiant. The major-
ity held that cross-examination should be permitted on leave where the 
accused can show that it will generate testimony relating to the validity of 
the authorization. 
It should be noted that these judicial reforms regarding access to 
wiretap authorizations apply only to accused persons and not to other 
citizens who may be the subject of a wiretap. 
Another fundamental right of the accused is the right to control his or 
her own defence. This right is jeopardized when the Crown is permitted to 
raise a defence on behalf of the accused, against the wishes of the accused. 
The Supreme Court addressed this issue in R. v. Swain19. The accused 
challenged the constitutionality of the common law rule which permitted 
the Crown to adduce evidence of an accused's insanity at trial, even where 
the accused did not wish to raise insanity as a defence. 
Writing for the majority, Lamer C.J.C. held that where the Crown 
raises the issue of insanity, the liberty of the accused is imperilled, so 
s. 7 may be invoked. When an accused has been found fit to stand trial, he is 
by definition fit to conduct his own defence. In other words, he is not insane 
at the time of the trial. The Crown's ability at trial to raise evidence of the 
accused's insanity at the time the offence was committed interferes with 
the accused's control over the conduct of his defence20. It can result in the 
presentation of contradictory defences, it can undermine the credibility of 
the accused or it can make it seem likely (as a result of traditional stereo-
types) that the accused is the type of person to have committed the crime 
with which he or she is charged. 
Thus, the majority found this common law rule does limit the rights of 
the accused under s. 7. On a s. 1 analysis, Lamer C.J.C. found that the two 
objectives of the rule — to avoid conviction of an accused who refuses to 
adduce evidence of his or her insanity and to protect the public from 
persons who are « presently dangerous » — were of sufficient importance 
to warrant overriding a constitutional right. He also found, however, that 
the common law rule impaired s. 7 rights more than was necessary to 
18. Dersch v. A.G. Canada, supra, note 17, 142; R. v. Garofoli, supra, note 17, 181. 
19. R. v. Swain, (1991) 63 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (S.C.C.). 
20. Id., 506. 
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accomplish these objectives. As a result, the common law rule was de-
clared of no force or effect. 
The Chief Justice went on to enunciate a new common law rule which 
would not infringe the rights of the accused. This rule «would allow the 
Crown to raise independently the issue of insanity only after the trier of 
fact had concluded that the accused was otherwise guilty of the offence 
charged21 ». Thus the Crown would not be able to interfere with the con-
duct of the accused's defence, but would be able to intervene «after 
a verdict of guilty had been reached, but prior to a conviction being 
entered22 ». 
The court went on to consider the constitutionality of s. 542(2) (now 
s. 614(2)) which mandates the trial judge to order an accused found not 
guilty by reason of insanity detained in strict custody « until the pleasure of 
the Lieutenant-Governor of the province is known23 ». There is no pro-
vision for a hearing and no discretion in the trial judge to make a different 
order. 
The court struck down s. 542(2) because the manner in which it 
deprived the accused of liberty was not in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice. Apart from the procedural defect — no hearing—the 
provision had a substantive defect: «The detention order is automatic, 
without any rational standard for determining which individual insanity 
acquittées should be detained and which should be released24. » 
It was also not saved by s. 1 because the means used to protect the 
public—detaining all insanity acquittées — was not the minimal impair-
ment necessary to achieve that objective25. 
In response to the decision in Swain and particularly in view of the fact 
that the Supreme Court allowed a six-month transitional period during 
which s. 542(2) would continue to be valid, Parliament recently passed an 
act amending the Criminal Code provisions with respect to insanity26. The 
purpose of the amendments, in the words of a Department of Justice 
information paper, is to 
21. W.,516. 
22. Ibid. 
23. Id., 533. 
24. Id., 535. 
25. LAMER C.J.C. stated they should be detained « no longer than necessary to determine 
whether they are currently dangerous due to their insanity ». R. v. Swain, supra, note 19, 
540. 
26. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (mental disorder), Bill C-30 (passed by the House of 
Commons, November 21, 1991), 3rd Session, 34th Legislature (Can.). 
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strengthen due process and fundamental Charter rights, thereby ensuring fair and 
equitable treatment of the mentally disordered offender in our society. At the same 
time, great care has been taken to ensure the continued protection of society 
against those few mentally disordered accused who are dangerous27. 
The legislation is in line with recommendations made by the Law 
Reform Commission of Canada in its 1976 Report, Mental Disorder in the 
Criminal Process28. 
The Mental Disorder Act seeks to achieve the dual goals of respecting 
the rights of the accused and protecting society by establishing a procedure 
for the assessment of the mental health of an accused. Assessments may be 
ordered not only to determine fitness to stand trial, but also to help 
determine an individual's mental status at the time of the offence29 and to 
assist the court in making an appropriate disposition, such as ordering that 
the accused have hospital treatment30. 
The legislation also implements « capping » provisions which limit the 
custodial periods for mentally disordered acquittées, such that it is no 
longer possible for them to remain in custody indefinitely31. Remands for 
assessment are also time-limited under the new Act32. 
There is one exception to the widespread trend toward increased 
protection of the rights of the accused. It occurs in the area of regulatory 
offences. Regulatory (or public welfare) offences were first defined in the 
case of Sault Ste. Marie33. In that case, the Supreme Court defined a public 
welfare offence as one of strict liability, halfway between a full mens rea 
offence and an absolute liability offence, where mere commission of an act 
was sufficient for liability. In the case of a strict liability offence, the Crown 
had only to prove commission of the act. The burden then shifted to the 
accused, who could avoid liability only by proving, on a balance of prob-
abilities, that he or she had acted with due diligence. 
In its recent decision in Wholesale Travel34, the Supreme Court agreed 
that, to reflect the particular nature or blameworthiness of a public welfare 
offence, the fault element need only be negligence. In other words, the 
27. « Mental Disorder Amendments to the CriminalCode », Ottawa, Federal Department of 
Justice, September, 1991. 
28. LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, Mental Disorder in the Criminal Process, 
Report 5, Ottawa, Information Canada, 1976. 
29. Criminal Code, s. 672.12. 
30. Id., s. 672.58 and 672.59. 
31. Id., s. 672.64 to 672.66. 
32. Id., s. 672.14. 
33. R. v. Corporation of The City of Sault Ste. Marie, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299. 
34. Wholesale Travel Group Inc. v. R., (1991) 84 D.L.R. (4th) 161 (S.C.C.). 
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accused need not have the guilty intent associated with a true mens rea 
offence in order to be liable for a public welfare or regulatory offence. 
A majority of seven judges found that the reverse onus on the accused 
to prove due diligence on a balance of probabilities violated the guarantee 
of the presumption of innocence in s. 11(d) of the Charter. However, a 
different and narrower majority (five judges) upheld the validity of the 
reverse onus provision35. In upholding the reverse onus for regulatory 
offences, even those carrying the possibility of jail terms, a majority of the 
court has expressed its preference for ensuring that regulatory offences 
may be successfully prosecuted over a concern for the right of the accused 
to the benefit of a reasonable doubt. The effect of Wholesale Travel is that 
an accused may be convicted of a regulatory offence and sentenced to 
prison even where the trial judge is left with a reasonable doubt as to 
whether the accused acted with due diligence. It is left to the accused to 
prove due diligence on a balance of probabilities. 
This decision is indicative of a growing concern about offences which 
harm not so much a particular individual as society itself. In the case of 
regulatory offences, when the court is balancing the rights of the accused 
with the protection of societal interests, the latter seem to be of greater 
concern. 
1.2 Rights of Victims and Vulnerable Witnesses 
Alongside the trend toward increased protection of the rights of the 
accused, we can also discern in recent years a trend toward increased 
protection of the rights of victims and a greater sensitivity to other vulner-
able citizens who may be caught up in the criminal justice system. As a 
society, we are becoming increasingly aware of the vulnerability of various 
groups to outmoded stereotypes and myths which have often led and 
continue to lead to inappropriate and even harmful treatment at the hands 
of the criminal justice system. 
Children, the elderly, people with mental disabilities or disorders, 
women, Aboriginal persons, members of ethnic, cultural and religious 
minorities—all are susceptible to particular problems when caught up in 
the system, problems which require awareness, acknowledgement and a 
degree of flexibility and creativity on the part of the actors in the criminal 
justice system. 
35. Three judges found that the provision was saved by s. 1 of the Charter while two judges 
found that it did not violate s. 11(d) in the first place. 
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Some selected examples can be given which reflect the increased will-
ingness on the part of the courts and slowly, the legislature, to deal with the 
problems of these vulnerable participants in the criminal justice process. 
Domestic violence has emerged in recent years as a social problem of 
great magnitude in Canada. As a result of public awareness campaigns, 
attitudes toward domestic violence have begun to shift toward accepting 
what has always been true : spousal abuse and child abuse are crimes. 
This shift in attitude is apparent in police charging policies, which have 
become increasingly aggressive in charging the alleged perpetrators of 
domestic violence, rather than treating such incidents as mere marital 
squabbles. Recognition of the seriousness of domestic violence has led 
slowly to the erosion of the myths that women who claim they are battered 
either are exaggerating or really like the abuse. There is a growing under-
standing that battered women are victims, virtual prisoners of their violent 
partners, prisoners in their own homes. 
The change in attitude can be seen in the courts as well. The Supreme 
Court took the lead in the case of/?, v. Lavallee36, where it accepted the use 
of expert testimony with respect to the battered wife syndrome. Madam 
Justice Wilson set out six principles on the basis of which such testimony is 
properly admitted. The thrust of these principles is to provide assistance to 
the factfinder, whether judge or jury, to understand the syndrome. This in 
turn can help to explain why self-defence may be a valid defence for a 
woman accused of killing her partner, even if she did not appear to be in 
imminent physical danger. It may explain why she did not leave her abusive 
partner. It may also « assist the jury in assessing the reasonableness of [the 
accused's] belief that killing her batterer was the only way to save her own 
life37». 
Another category of women who are liable to suffer once as victims of 
crime and a second time at the hands of a sometimes insensitive justice 
system are victims of sexual assault. In 1985, Parliament formally rec-
ognized that the prejudice traditionally suffered by these victims when 
they have testified in court was based on attitudes and stereotypes that 
were both sexist and irrelevant. It enacted ss. 276 and 277 of the Criminal 
Code to shield complainants from irrelevant and harmful cross-examin-
ation which often victimized the complainant all over again by needlessly 
exposing and attacking her personal life. 
36. R. v. Lavallee, (1990) 55 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.). 
37. Id., 125. 
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As discussed earlier, s. 276 was recently struck down by the Supreme 
Court38. In doing so, however, the majority made it clear that its rejection 
of s. 276 did not constitute a rejection of the principles behind its enact-
ment : 
[The] reality in 1991 is that evidence of sexual conduct and reputation in itself 
cannot be regarded as logically probative of either the complainant's credibility or 
consent. Although they still may inform the thinking of many, the twin myths 
which s. 276 sought to eradicate are just that — myths — and have no place in a 
rational and just system of law. It follows that the old rules which permitted 
evidence of sexual conduct and condoned invalid inferences from it solely for 
these purposes have no place in our law.39 
Nevertheless, out of concern that the striking down of s. 276 would in 
fact lead to renewed irrelevant cross-examination of complainants in cases 
of sexual assault, the Minister of Justice introduced new legislation to 
replace s. 276 in light of the decision in Seaboyer40. In keeping with the need 
to balance the rights of the accused with those of the complainant, the Bill 
states that evidence of the sexual activity of the complainant is not admiss-
ible to support an inference that she is more likely to have consented to the 
act in question, nor may it be used to attack her credibility. The accused 
may, however, apply to the judge to determine whether evidence of the 
complainant's sexual activity may be admitted. The jury and the public 
would be excluded from such a hearing and the complainant could not be 
compelled to testify. The accused would have to prove that the evidence is 
of specific instances of sexual activity, is relevant to a trial issue and « has 
significant probative value that is not substantially outweighed by the 
danger of prejudice to the proper administration of justice41 ». 
In addition, the Bill contains new provisions which define consent for 
the first time in the context of sexual offences. If the provisions are passed, 
it would mean, inter alia, that consent is not valid unless given by the 
person who actually engages in the sexual activity (in other words, a third 
party cannot consent on behalf of the complainant). A complainant who is 
intoxicated is incapable of giving a valid consent, as is a complainant who 
engages in the activity because the accused has abused a position of trust or 
authority42. 
These amendments would once again put a certain, although limited 
discretion in the hands of trial judges to determine the relevance of the 
38. See discussion of R. v. Seaboyer, section 1.1. 
39. R. v. Seaboyer, supra, note 13, 406. 
40. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (sexual assault), Bill C-49 (First reading), 
3rd Session, 34th Legislature (Can.). 
41. Id., s. 2, amending s. 276(2) and adding s. 276.2 to the Criminal Code. 
42. Id., s. 2, adding s. 273.1(2) to the Criminal Code. 
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complainant's sexual history. How these provisions are interpreted, if the 
bill is passed, will be a benchmark of how much attitudes have changed 
with respect to female victims of sexual assault, if at all. 
In keeping with the trend toward greater understanding of the nature 
and effects of spousal assault has come a greater understanding of child 
abuse and its effects on victims. One of the effects is that it may require 
years for victims of child abuse to be able to recognize and come to terms 
with what they underwent. Only then can they summon the courage and 
strength to lay charges against the abuser. 
One of the obstacles to the successful prosecution of such cases has 
been the sometimes lengthy delay between the abuse and complaints to the 
police resulting in charges being laid. Courts in the past have, at times, 
ruled that a lengthy passage of time before the laying of charges was 
sufficiently prejudicial to the accused to justify a stay of proceedings. 
Once again, the Supreme Court has paved the way for a more informed 
approach in such cases. In R. v. L.( W.K.)*3, a man was accused of sexually 
assaulting his daughters and stepdaughter over a period of 27 years. The 
first incident was alleged to have occurred in 1957 ; the last in 1985. The 
complainants first reported the alleged incidents to the police in July 1986 
and the accused was charged in January 1987. 
The trial judge stayed the charges at a pre-trial motion, on the basis of 
pre-charge delay. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the 
judge had had sufficient material before him to order a stay on the basis that 
the accused was being denied the right to a fair trial. The judge had made 
findings of fact with respect to the allegations of the complainants without 
any evidentiary basis for those findings and without the benefit of having 
heard testimony from the complainants. 
The Supreme Court acknowledged that an accused can claim his or her 
rights have been denied because of delay alone. The question, however, 
was whether an accused can rely solely upon the passage of time apparent 
on the face of the indictment to establish a violation of ss. 7 or 11(d)44. The 
court unanimously declared this was not sufficient : « An accused's rights 
are not infringed solely because a lengthy delay is apparent on the face of 
the indictment45. » 
43. R. v. L. (W.K.), (1991) 64 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.). 
44. Id., 327. 
45. Id., 328. This point is illustrated in the recent Manitoba Queen's Bench decision, R. v. 
Daley, [1992] Man. Q. B., where Oliphant A.C.J, found that a 23-year pre-charge delay 
had resulted in an infringement of the accused's s. 11(d) right to afair trial. As reported in 
a recent issue of The Lawyers Weekly (1992) 11, 10 : « The judge stressed that something 
more than a simple effluxion of time had occurred » and referred to the failure to testify 
of two witnesses who could have supported the complainant's allegations. 
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Most significantly for the victims of child sexual abuse, the court 
recognized that in these types of cases, delay is to be expected, and should 
not necessarily operate to shield the accused. 
It is well documented that non-reporting, incomplete reporting, and delay in 
reporting are common in cases of sexual abuse. The 1984 Report of the Committee 
on Sexual Offences Against Children and Youths (the Badgley Report) [...] 
concluded that : 
[...] For three in four female victims and about nine in ten male victims, 
these incidents had been kept as closely guarded personal secrets. 
For victims of sexual abuse to complain would take courage and emotional 
strength in revealing those personal secrets, in opening old wounds. If proceedings 
were to be stayed based solely on the passage of time between the abuse and the 
charge, victims would be required to report incidents before they were psy-
chologically prepared for the consequences of that reporting46. 
In light of the above, the Supreme Court upheld the B.C. Court of 
Appeal's dismissal of the stay of proceedings. 
Part of the trend toward greater protection of vulnerable witnesses is 
found in s. 486(2.1) Cr.C. This section permits complainants under 18 years 
old to testify outside the courtroom or from behind a screen in cases of 
sexual offences. Enacted as part of the 1985 reforms to the Criminal Code, 
this provision was recently the subject of a constitutional challenge. In the 
case of R. v. Levogiannis47, the accused argued that this provision was 
inconsistent with ss. 7 and 11(d). Morden A.C.J.O., in upholding the 
constitutional validity of the provision, stated that 
it should be the usual practice for the judge to instruct the jury to the effect [...] that 
the use of the screen is a procedure that is allowed in cases of this kind by reason of 
the youth of the witnesses and that, since it has nothing to do with the guilt or 
innocence of the accused, the jury must not draw any inference of any kind from its 
use and, specifically, that no adverse inference should be drawn against the 
accused because of it. 
[...] it can be said that only if juries are incapable of following the explicit 
instructions of the trial judge that the use of the screen has no bearing on the guilt 
or innocence of the accused, could the conclusion that s. 486(2.1) infringed the 
accused's right to a « fair hearing » be justified48. 
The practicalities of implementing an order under this provision 
should not be exaggerated. The courts in Quebec, for instance, have access 
to a mobile unit which enables any courtroom to be adapted to the use of a 
screen. 
46. R. v. L. (W.K.), supra, note 43, 328. 
47. R. v. Levogiannis, (1990) 1 O.R. (3d) 351 (CA.). 
48. Id., 371, 372. 
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It should be noted as well that the provision requiring corroboration 
for the unsworn testimony of children (s. 586 Cr.C.) was repealed in 1988, 
as were the related provisions of the Canada Evidence Act and the Young 
Offenders Act. The rationale for these repeals is captured, at least in part, 
by the reasoning of Madam Justice Wilson in a case interpreting s. 586: 
Since the only evidence implicating the accused in many sexual offences against 
children will be the evidence of the child, imposing too restrictive a standard on 
their testimony may permit serious offences to go unpunished and perhaps to 
continue49. 
By repealing s. 586, Parliament removed a serious obstacle to the 
conviction of child molesters. 
1.3 Rights of Suspects and Third Parties 
The trend toward greater fairness through greater protection of indi-
vidual rights has been extended not only to accused persons, victims and 
witnesses, but to suspects and third parties as well. These protections may 
be the best measure of the strength of personal freedoms in a society, 
because they reveal what limits, if any, are placed on the state's law 
enforcement powers. 
One of the most fundamental aspects of freedom is the right to privacy. 
In two recent cases, the Supreme Court of Canada has drawn the line on the 
power of state agencies to intrude on the privacy of citizens, relying on 
the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure. In R. v. 
Duarte50, the court considered whether «participant surveillance51 » by 
state agencies (that is, electronic recording of a conversation where one 
party to the conversation agrees to the recording) constitutes an unreason-
able search and seizure, contrary to s. 8 of the Charter. 
Although the Criminal Code itself does not require prior judicial 
authorization for such a recording, the Supreme Court noted that the 
« primary value served by s. 8 is privacy52 » and found that it was « unac-
ceptable in a free society that the agencies of the state be free to use this 
technology at their sole discretion. The threat this would pose to privacy is 
wholly unacceptable53. » 
49. R. v. B.(C), (1990) 56 C.C.C. (3d) 161 (S.C.C.), 180. 
50. R. v. Duarte, (1990) 53 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.). 
51. Id., 10. 
52. Ibid. 
53. Id., 11. 
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The question then becomes, when does an individual in this state have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy ? La Forest J. for the majority stated as 
follows : 
If privacy may be defined as the right of the individual to determine for himself 
when, how, and to what extent he will release personal information about himself, 
a reasonable expectation of privacy would seem to demand that an individual may 
proceed on the assumption that the state may only violate this right by recording 
private communications on a clandestine basis when it has established to the 
satisfaction of a detached judicial officer that an offence has been or is being 
committed and that interception of private communications stands to afford 
evidence of the offence54. 
Thus while the Code does not require prior judicial authorization for 
participant electronic surveillance, s. 8 of the Charter does. 
This ruling was extended to cover surreptitious video surveillance in 
the case of R. v. Wong55. Again, the Supreme Court had to consider what 
constituted a «reasonable expectation of privacy». It found that, even 
where a person circulated invitations and opened his hotel room to stran-
gers, he had a reasonable expectation of privacy, because there was no 
« logical nexus » between these factors and the conclusion that police 
should have been free to videotape the proceedings at their sole discretion. 
The court underlined that a search conducted without prior judicial 
authorization should not be validated after the fact because the surveil-
lance revealed criminal activities. The question was whether such un-
authorized video surveillance diminished the amount of privacy and free-
dom remaining to citizens « to a compass inconsistent with the aims of a 
free and open society56 ». As to whether evidence obtained in violation of 
s. 8 should be admitted, that must be determined under s. 24(2). 
The Supreme Court had occasion to examine the right to privacy of 
third parties in two companion cases: C.B.C. v. Lessard and C.B.C. v. 
New Brunswick (A.G.)57. There the issue was whether freedom of the press 
requires that, before issuing a warrant to the police to search media offices, 
a justice of the peace be satisfied that no reasonable alternative source of 
information exists. 
Cory J. for the majority stated that because a search is always in-
trusive, 
54. Id., 12. 
55. R. v. Wong, (1990) 60 C.C.C. (3d) 460 (S.C.C.). 
56. Id., 478. 
57. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation v. Lessard, (1991) 67 C.C.C. (3d) 517 (S.C.C.) ; 
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation v. New Brunswick (Attorney General) 67 C.C.C. 
(3d) 544 (S.C.C). 
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a justice of the peace considering a search warrant application must undertake a 
careful weighing of the privacy interests of individuals in a democratic society 
against the interests of the state in investigating and prosecuting crimes58. 
While he found that it was not a constitutionally required condition for 
the issuance of a warrant that there be no reasonable alternative source of 
information, Cory J. did set out nine factors a justice of the peace should 
consider before issuing a search warrant for media premises and this was 
one of them. While these two cases are restricted on their facts to searches 
of the media and not other innocent third parties, the judicial guidelines 
they establish do seek to protect an institution which, as Cory J. put it, 
plays « a vital role in the functioning of a democratic society59 ». One may 
venture to hope that when the courts consider granting search warrants 
against private citizens, they will weigh the privacy interests of those 
citizens against the interests of the state with equal care. 
Recently, the Supreme Court has had occasion to pronounce on what 
may be viewed as another aspect of the right to silence, that is, the right to 
retain and instruct counsel upon arrest or detention, as protected by s. 
10(b) of the Charter. In the case of R. v. Elshaw60, the police were called to 
investigate a possible incident of child molesting in a public park. Two 
police officers arrived on the scene and kept the suspect in a police van 
while obtaining statements from the children in question and the adults who 
had called. One officer then had a conversation with the suspect, who made 
a self-incriminating statement. The police had not advised him of his right 
to remain silent nor of his right to counsel61. 
The issue before the court was whether, given the violation of s. 10(b), 
the self-incriminating statement was admissible under s. 24(2), that is, 
would its admission bring the administration of justice into disrepute. The 
court reviewed the four factors on the basis of which the accused attacked 
the admission of his statement. They were : the seriousness of the Charter 
violation, the circumstances of urgency or necessity, the wilful or flagrant 
nature of the violation and speculation that the evidence would have been 
obtained in any event. 
Writing for the majority (six of seven judges), Iacobucci J. stated that, 
with respect to the seriousness of the Charter violation, although the 
detention was brief, it was not the period of detention that was important 
58. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation v. Lessard, supra, note 57, 533. 
59. Id., 534. 
60. R. v. Elshaw, (1991) 67 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.). 
61. The Crown conceded, and all the judges at all levels, with the exception of L'Heureux-
Dubé J. agreed, that the accused had been detained within the meaning of the Charter, 
such as to trigger his s. 10(b) right. 
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but rather the fact that « police obtained evidence from a detained person 
prior to fulfilling their responsibilities under s. 10(b)62 ». 
As for the circumstances, the court found that while it may have been 
urgent to detain the suspect (as he then was), there was no urgency to 
question him in violation of a Charter right. 
With respect to the flagrant nature of the violation, Iacobucci J. held 
that just because the police may have acted in good faith « will not 
strengthen the case for admission [of evidence] to cure an unfair trial63 ». 
Finally, commenting on the B.C. Court of Appeal's observation that the 
suspect would have made the same self-incriminating statement even if 
police had complied with s. 10(b), Iacobucci J. stated : « To base admission 
on the ground that he might have confessed completely undermines the 
enshrinement of the right to counsel in the Charter64. » 
The above decisions demonstrate that the judiciary at the highest level 
in this country is concerned with ensuring that all individuals caught up in 
the criminal justice system, whether as suspects, accused, victims or 
innocent third parties, enjoy the full benefit of the rights and freedoms 
promised them by the Charter. 
2. Diversion and Decriminalization 
Frustration with the inefficiency, complexity and growing costs of the 
traditional court process has led to an increasing interest, over the past few 
years, in alternate dispute resolution or ADR, as it is commonly known. 
This term encompasses a broad range of dispute resolution techniques, 
which fall into one of the following categories : negotiation, mediation or 
adjudication. 
Several provincial and national task forces in recent years have con-
sidered the use of ADR when reviewing ways to improve existing court 
structures65. The Report of the Nova Scotia Court Structure Task Force 
summarized what it saw as the two main reasons for this recent increased 
interest in ADR : 
62. Id., 125. 
63. Id., 127. 
64. Id., 128. 
65. BRITISH COLUMBIA JUSTICE REFORM COMMITTEE, Access to justice : Report of the 
Justice Reform Committee presented to the Attorney General ofB.-C., Victoria, Minis-
try of Attorney General, 1988; T.G. ZUBER, Report of the Ontario Courts Inquiry, 
Toronto, Ministry of the Attorney General, 1987. CANADIAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TASK 
FORCE ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, Report of the Canadian Bar Associa-
tion Task Force on Alternative Dispute Resolution : A Canadian perspective, Ottawa, 
Canadian Bar foundation, 1989. 
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One is philosophical : a preference for dispute resolution that emphasizes com-
promise rather than « winner take all » ; consensus rather than confrontation ; 
community values over individualism. In short, a society that is harmonious, not 
litigious. 
[...] 
The second reason [...] is the more prosaic one : the need for speedy, cheap and 
efficient dispute resolution mechanisms that are well adapted to the issues the 
parties need resolved66. 
Here we see expressed the combined need for fairness and efficiency 
which we noted at the outset as the most evident recent trends in criminal 
law reform. 
The growing interest in ADR is accompanied by the growth of another 
concept : restorative justice. While ADR is often associated with the res-
olution of civil disputes (although it can apply to criminal law as well), 
restorative justice applies specifically to the criminal justice system. Re-
storative justice focuses on 
1) an expanded role for victims in the criminal justice system ; 
2) the expansion of community participation in criminal justice through 
community crime prevention programs ; and 
3) the inclusion of reparation, restitution and reconciliation as goals of 
criminal justice. 
The Report of the CBA Task Force on ADR reviewed four potential 
procedures which could heighten ADR in the context of criminal cases : 
pre-trial discovery ; pre-trial conferences ; plea bargaining ; and diversion. 
Effective pre-trial discovery, or disclosure, discussed above as a right 
of the accused, can also be a means of narrowing the issues and may even 
result in a greater number of guilty pleas. In either case, justice is served 
and court time is saved. The Law Reform Commission of Canada ad-
vocated amending the Criminal Code to ensure a formal pre-trial discovery 
process as early as 197467. Its recommendation was echoed by the Report 
of the Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall Jr. Prosecution. By 
mandating Crown disclosure in Stinchcombe^, the Supreme Court of 
Canada achieved, at least in part, what Parliament to date has not. 
66. Report of the Nova Scotia Court Structure Task Force, Halifax, The Task Force, 1991, 
p. 381. 
67. LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, Discovery, Working Paper 4, Ottawa, The 
Commission, 1974. 
68. R. v. Stinchcombe, supra, note 9. 
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With respect to plea bargaining, the Law Reform Commission of 
Canada devoted a Working Paper to this topic three years ago69. It recom-
mended guidelines which would make the process of negotiating a plea 
agreement more open and fair. For example, it recommended that judicial 
officers before whom an accused is to appear should not offer any induce-
ment to the accused to plead guilty. It also recommended that accused 
persons in similar circumstances be given the same opportunities to engage 
in plea discussions. The view of victims should be taken into account 
before a prosecutor concludes a plea agreement. A prosecutor and an 
accused who have concluded a plea agreement should disclose the sub-
stance of and reasons for that agreement in open court70. While there have 
been no legislative enactments to mandate that these guidelines are fol-
lowed, it is to be hoped that such recommendations encourage greater 
fairness and openness in the negotiation of plea agreements. 
Diversion is a concept that the Law Reform Commission of Canada 
explored in the early and mid-70s. It is of more than passing interest to note 
that the ideas which emerged from its 1975 paper Studies in Diversion71 
— emphasis on restoration of community harmony through non-adversary 
processes, forging links between offender, victim and community, focus on 
enhancing integration rather than isolation of the offender—form the 
backbone of Aboriginal justice systems. The close parallel between tra-
ditional Aboriginal methods of maintaining social order and harmony and 
emerging mainstream notions of ADR is striking72. 
It is more than coincidence that many of the recommendations the 
Law Reform Commission of Canada made in its most recent report to 
Parliament, Aboriginal Peoples and Criminal Justice73, incorporate vari-
ous forms of ADR. While expressed in the context of a report on how the 
system can be improved with respect to Aboriginal people, these recom-
mendations would have an equally beneficial effect if applied across the 
board to all offenders. For example, Recommendation 13(5) stated that : 
«The Criminal Code should contain a counterpart to the «alternative 
69. LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, Plea Discussions and Agreements, Working 
Paper 60, Ottawa, The Commission, 1989. 
70. Id., recommendations 6, 8, II, 12, pp. 68-69. 
71. LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, Diversion, Working Paper 7, Ottawa, The 
Commission, 1975. 
72. For a detailed discussion, see M. JACKSON, In Search of the Pathways to Justice: 
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Aboriginal Communities, unpublished study paper for 
Law Reform Commission of Canada, May, 1991 (to be published in Spring issue of 
U.B.C.L. Rev.). 
73. LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, Aboriginal Peoples and Criminal Justice, 
Report 34, Ottawa, The Commission, 1991. 
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measures » provisions in the Young Offenders Act, for disposing of and 
diverting cases against adult Aboriginal offenders74. » 
The Commission went on to say : «Indeed, in our view such alter-
native measures should be available in all criminal cases75. » 
The Commission was pursuing its work in the area of ADR in a 
projected Report to Parliament (diversion : A Fresh Look at Alternative 
Dispute Resolution Mechanisms). The Report was seeking to analyze 
existing alternate dispute resolution mechanisms and identify those that 
are capable of effective implementation in our system of criminal justice. 
On a more particularized level, the Law Reform Commission of Ca-
nada, prior to its abolition, was pursuing a joint project on drug laws and 
enforcement policies with the Canadian Centre for Drug Abuse. This 
project was examining alternatives to current enforcement techniques 
which may ensure better compliance with drug laws. The philosophy 
underlying the laws as well was also being reviewed. Such projects could 
have served as models for the integration of alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms in the criminal justice system. 
It would be wrong to leave the impression that the government has not 
introduced legislation which promotes diversion and decriminalization. 
Bill C-46, An Act Respecting Contraventions of Federal Enactments, is a 
step in this direction. The purposes of the Act, as stated in s. 4, are: 
(a) to provide a procedure for the prosecution of contraventions that 
reflects the distinction between criminal offences and regulatory of-
fences and that is in addition to the procedures set out in the Criminal 
Code for the prosecution of contraventions and other offences ; and 
(b) to alter or abolish the consequences in law of being convicted of a 
contravention, in light of that distinction76. 
The motivation behind introduction of the ticketing scheme proposed 
in this legislation may be found in the increasing cost of justice in these 
times of financial restraint. Those involved in the criminal justice system 
are more willing to consider and to implement alternatives to traditional 
methods. As the saying goes, necessity is the mother of invention. 
If enacted, the Contraventions Act will greatly facilitate the prosecu-
tion of regulatory offences by imposing a much less formal and time-con-
suming process to deal with violations than is applied in the case of criminal 
74. Id., 70. 
75. Ibid. 
76. An Act Respecting Contraventions of Federal Enactments, (First Reading), 3rd Session, 
34,h Legislature (Can.). 
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offences. This federal ticketing scheme draws on recommendations made 
by the Law Reform Commission in its 1986 Working Paper, Classification 
of Offences77. There the Commission argued in favour of a separate régime 
outside the Criminal Code which would govern the prosecution of regu-
latory offences. 
Provinces like Quebec and Ontario have already implemented a sim-
plified procedure for the prosecution of provincial offences. Moving away 
from the cumbersome procedure of Part XXVII of the Criminal Code 
(Summary Convictions), Quebec has recently enacted a Code of Penal 
Procedure78 containing an expeditious and cost-effective ticketing pro-
cedure. It is to be hoped that the federal government will eventually extend 
the « decriminalized » procedure of the Contraventions Act to all summary 
conviction offences under the Criminal Code. 
3. Streamlining the Process 
3.1 Court Reform 
The concept of a unified criminal court is one which has gained 
increasing momentum over the last few years. Several provinces have 
examined their court structures and concluded that a move toward unifica-
tion is desirable. In some cases, such as that of Ontario and British Colum-
bia, recent legislation has succeeded in eliminating one tier of the court 
structure. 
The British Columbia Courts Amendment Act79, which came into 
force on July 1, 1990, gives effect to a merger of the County Court with the 
Supreme Court which has now become, in British Columbia, a court of 
original jurisdiction in both civil and criminal cases. The Ontario Courts of 
Justice Amendment Act, 1989s0, which came into force on September 1, 
1990, reduces Ontario's court structure from a three-tiered to a two-tiered 
system. 
These Acts are in keeping with the spirit of recommendations made by 
the Law Reform Commission of Canada in its Working Paper 59, Toward a 
Unified Criminal Court81, which advocated the creation in each province of 
77. LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, Classification of Offences, Working Paper 54, 
Ottawa, The Commission, 1986. 
78. Code of Penal Procedure, R.S.Q., c. C-25.1. 
79. British Columbia Courts Amendment Act, S.C., 1990, c. 16. 
80. Courts of Justice Amendment Act, S.O., 1989, c. 55. 
81. LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, Toward a Unified Criminal Court, Working 
Paper 59, Ottawa, The Commission, 1989. 
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a single court or court division to deal with criminal matters. As an interim 
measure, the Commission recommended that unification be accomplished 
in stages, by reducing by one level the number of courts with criminal 
jurisdiction in provinces which presently have three levels. This is what 
Ontario and British Columbia have done. The Commission believed that a 
unified criminal court would address three problems found in a multi-level 
court system : the complexity of the system, delays in the judicial process 
and the apparent hierarchy of courts. 
In Quebec, which has always had only two levels of court, recent 
restructuring has had the effect ofmerging all provincial courts into one82. 
Nova Scotia's review of its court structure is the most recent of such 
provincial undertakings. The Nova Scotia Court Structure Task Force 
recommended the merger of the County Courts with the Trial Division of 
the Nova Scotia Supreme Court. In addition, in considering the merits of a 
unified criminal court, the Task Force recommended the implementation 
of a pilot project. It concluded : 
While we do not embrace the unified criminal court uncritically, it has enormous 
potential to do good and it is the most promising proposal abroad today. The test 
will be the practical experience of dealing with appeals, reviews and routine 
matters83. 
Not all groups favour the implementation of a unified criminal court. 
The Canadian Bar Association Task Force Report—Court Reform in 
Canada84—concluded that «the move to a unified criminal court is not 
likely to have sufficient good effects to justify the exercise85 ». However, if 
governments were to implement unified criminal courts, the CBA Task 
Force, like its counterpart in Nova Scotia, recommended the implementa-
tion and professional assessment of a pilot project or projects. 
3.2 Caseflow Management 
Like the issue of a unified criminal court, caseflow management has 
been discussed in numerous studies by provincial and professional associ-
ation task forces. This term describes the «effective management of the 
flow of cases through the courts86 ». It has also been defined as « super-
vision or management of the time and events involved in the movement of a 
82. Courts of Justice Act, R.S.Q., c. T-16. 
83. Report of the Nova Scotia Court Structure Task Force, supra, note 66, p. 137. 
84. Report of the Canadian Bar Association Task Force on Court Reform in Canada, 
Ottawa, The Canadian Bar Association, 1991. 
85. Id., p. 113. 
86. Report of the Nova Scotia Court Structure Task Force, supra, note 66, p. 318. 
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case through the court system from the point of initiation to disposition, 
regardless of the type of disposition87 ». It is a way of reducing or elimi-
nating a backlog of cases, particularly at the trial level. If successful, it is a 
way of ensuring trials within a reasonable time. 
The major requirements for active supervision of the progress of cases 
may be listed as : 
1) early and continuous control of cases ; 
2) time standards governing the case as a whole and intermediate steps in 
the process ; 
3) constant monitoring and measuring of compliance with the time stan-
dards ; and 
4) firm dates for trial and intermediate steps, through strict control of 
adjournments. 
In determining who should be responsible for criminal cases flowing 
through the courts as quickly and efficiently as possible, there is general 
agreement that this is a role best played by the judiciary for it is judges who 
control abuse of process. As Justice Zuber commented in his report : 
[Those] accused of crime and their counsel are often disinterested in trial within a 
reasonable time. Delay is perceived not as a factor which will impair the ability of 
the accused to present a defence but rather a factor which will erode the case for 
the prosecution. It is therefore most often the defence which seeks delay. Courts 
should no more tolerate delay by the accused than by the prosecution88. 
Placing the burden on the Crown is not a better solution, as the Crown 
will be hampered by financial restraints and personnel shortages. In a 
working paper called Trial Within A Reasonable Time that would have 
been published shortly89, the Law Reform Commission of Canada states 
that the « fundamental premise of caseflow management is that judges must 
accept responsibility for the active supervision and management of every 
case, from filing to disposition90 ». 
In addition to caseflow management, which is an administrative ap-
proach to the problem of delay, the Law Reform Commission has recom-
mended the enactment of statutory limitation periods in the criminal justice 
process. Again, it would be up to the judiciary to enforce the limitation 
87. M. SOLOMON et D.K. SOMERLOT, Caseflow Management in the Trial Court—Now and 
for the Future, Chicago, American Bar Association, 1987, p. 3. 
88. Report of the Ontario Courts Inquiry, supra, note 65, p. 73. 
89. LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, Trial Within a Reasonable Time, Working 
Paper 67, unpublished document, Ottawa. (The Law Reform Commission was abolished 
before the paper could be published.) 
90. Id., p. 30. 
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periods. This legislative approach is intended to be complementary to the 
administrative approach already described. The limitation periods would 
begin only after charges have been laid and would end at the commen-
cement of a trial. 
The Supreme Court decision in R. v. Askov91 provided additional 
impetus for court administrators to establish more efficient systems of 
caseflow management if they did not wish to see hundreds of criminal cases 
dismissed due to systemic delay. 
Askov established that there were four factors to be considered in 
assessing whether there has been unreasonable delay contrary to s. 11(b) of 
the Charter : the length of the delay, explanation for the delay, waiver and 
prejudice to the accused. Systemic delay is part of the delay attributable to 
the Crown and therefore necessarily counts in favour of the accused. 
Although difficult to assess with accuracy, it can result and has resulted in 
serious charges being stayed. 
In making its findings, a majority of the court held that s. 11(b) protects 
not only the right of the accused to trial within a reasonable time (its 
primary aim), but also protects an implicit societal or community interest. 
Cory J. describes this interest as « ensuring that those who transgress the 
law are brought to trial and dealt with according to the law » and also, 
seeing that «those individuals on trial [are] treated fairly and justly92». 
This reasoning exemplifies how fairness and efficiency not only can 
but must go hand in hand. 
3.3 Simplification of Procedure 
Another way in which the criminal justice process may be streamlined 
is through the simplification of procedure. The Law Reform Commission of 
Canada has recommended revisions to the procedures for election, deemed 
election and re-election93. The proposed new scheme would simplify the 
election and re-election process while substantially reducing the scope for 
improper manipulation of these procedures, without sacrificing procedural 
fairness or legitimate advantages94. 
Criminal procedure may also be streamlined through use of pre-trial 
motions and pre-hearing conferences. The Commission has recommended 
91. R. v. Askov, (1991) 59 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.). 
92. Id., 474. 
93. See Chapter III of the unpublished paper of LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, 
supra, note 89. 
94. Id., p. 132. 
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that a general statutory provision be enacted authorizing pre-trial motions, 
to clear up any ambiguity remaining after the decision in R. v. Chabot95, 
which left it in doubt as to whether a court has jurisdiction to deal with pre-
trial motions where an indictment has not been preferred. Such motions 
could then dispose of all issues which can conveniently be dealt with in 
advance of trial and in the absence of the jury, and which do not depend on 
the evidence to be presented in the case proper96. 
Since 1989, the Criminal Code has provided for the holding of pre-
hearing conferences, at the initiative of any of the parties, on consent. In 
the case of jury trials, such conferences are mandatory (s. 625.1). Pre-
hearing conferences could be an appropriate forum for disclosure, for plea 
negotiation, for arriving at an agreed statement of facts or the resolution of 
other issues not seriously in dispute, to cite a few examples97. 
4. Greater Use of Technology 
The increasing use of new technology in recent years has contributed 
both to greater efficiency and greater fairness in the criminal justice sys-
tem. Greater efficiency because reliance on techniques such as telewar-
rants lessens the use of court time for certain procedures. Greater fairness 
because the use of technology may allow courts to rely to a greater extent 
on objective evidence, such as DNA testing or videotapes of the alleged 
criminal activities, as opposed to the testimony of witnesses or police 
officers. 
4.1 Police 
The police may use technology to assist in their investigations. Cam-
eras and video surveillance can greatly enhance the accuracy and reliability 
of police reports of criminal activity. Video cameras such as those com-
monly used by banks for the purpose of recording robberies have been 
installed in public places with a high incidence of crime and hooked up to 
police stations where officers can monitor them. The Montreal police use 
this system in certain subway stations98. 
The police may also use video cameras to record investigations of 
suspects or accused persons. This technique was pioneered in Canada in a 
pilot project conducted by the Halton Regional Police, based on recom-
95. R. v. Chabot, (1981) 55 C.C.C. (2d) 385 (S.C.C.). 
96. LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, supra, note 89, p. 156. 
97. Id., Chapter 4, 111(B). 
98. G. LÉTOURNEAU et A. MORIN, « Technologie nouvelle et droit pénal canadien », (1989) 
49R.du B. 821-827. 
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mendations made by the Law Reform Commission of Canada . Evaluation 
of the project revealed that it resulted in appreciable savings of court time, 
as an accused who had made an incriminating statement was more likely to 
plead guilty100. A similar pilot project in New Zealand met with equal 
success and nation-wide implementation is now planned101. 
Section 487.1 of the Criminal Code permits a peace officer to apply for 
a warrant by submitting an information on oath by telephone or other 
means of telecommunication where « it would be impracticable to appear 
personally before a justice to make application102». The oath itself may 
also be administered by telephone or other means of telecommunication. 
Telewarrants are therefore an effective way of expediting the issuance of 
warrants to peace officers in remote areas or on the evenings or weekends, 
when courts are not sitting. A designated duty judge need only be access-
ible by telephone to be able to issue telewarrants. 
Police use of technology may also assist victims by alleviating the 
burden of testimony. Section 715.1 of the Criminal Code permits victims of 
sexual offences who were under 18 at the time of the alleged offence to 
describe the acts complained of on videotape. If the videotape was made 
within a reasonable time after the alleged offence, the complainant may 
simply adopt the contents of the videotape while testifying. We should 
point out, however, that this section of the Code has been held to violate 
ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter and therefore to be of no force and effect103. 
4.2; Courts 
* Technology may of course be used to promote the efficiency of court 
proceedings. For instance, the accused should be permitted to appear and 
to plead by telephone or other means of communication, where the court 
and the prosecutor consent. This was the recommendation of the Law 
99. LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, Questioning Suspects, Working Paper 32, 
Ottawa, Minister of Supply and Services, 1984. 
100; A. GRANT, The Audio-Visual Taping of Police Interviews with Suspects and Accused 
Persons by Halton Regional Police Force, An Evaluation, First Interim Report, Ottawa, 
Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1985 ; Final Report, Ottawa, Law Reform Com-
mission of Canada 1987. 
101. A Report on The New Zealand Video Interview Project, Wellington, Ne w Zealand Police 
National Headquarters, 1991. 
102. Criminal Code, s. 487.1. 
103. R. v. Thompson, (1989) 68 C.R. (3d) 328 (Alta. Q.B.) ; also, R. v. Christensen, (1989) 
8 W.C.B. (2d) 13 (Ont. Dist. Ct.) ;R. v. Laramee, (1991) 65 C.C.C. (3d) 465 (Man. C.A.). 
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Reform Commission of Canada in a recent working paper and a report104. 
There has already been at least one instance of pleading by telephone : a 
person imprisoned in Quebec registered a guilty plea by telephone to a 
court in New Jersey and received his sentence the same way105. 
The phrase « other means of communication » in section 487.1 of the 
Criminal Code and the Law Reform Commission documents clearly in-
cludes use of the facsimile, or fax machine. Several state courts in the 
United States already allow for the filing of court documents by fax. This 
procedure has proven very beneficial for rural judicial districts, where 
judges have jurisdiction over a large and sparsely populated geographic 
territory106. There is no doubt that Canada could benefit from similar use of 
the fax machine. 
Technology is not solely a vehicle for efficiency. It may also promote 
fairness. For instance, technology may be used to alleviate the burden on 
young victims of sexual offences by affording the possibility of testifying by 
closed-circuit television. Complainants in this category may testify outside 
the courtroom so long as the accused, the judge and the jury are able to 
watch the testimony on closed-circuit television107. 
The use of cameras in the courtroom is another example of how the use 
of technology may advance one of the basic principles underlying our 
criminal justice system — openness. This aspect of courtroom procedure is 
governed by provincial legislation like the Judicature Act of Ontario which 
has prohibited cameras in court buildings since 1984108. Canadian court-
rooms are a long way from being the site for spectacles such as the William 
Kennedy Smith trial. 
104. L A W REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, Double Jeopardy, Pleas and Verdicts, 
Working Paper 63, Ottawa, The Commission, 1991, recommendation 16, p. 72 (re 
appearance) and recommendation 21, p. 80 (re pleading) ; L A W REFORM COMMISSION 
OF CANADA, Aboriginal Peoples and Criminal Justice, supra, note 73, recommendation 
11(5), p. 58 (re appearance). 
105. M.C. AUGER, «Première mondiale, jugé par téléphone», Le Devoir, 15 mars 1989, 
pp. A-l et A-10. 
106. S. KOENIG, Courts in the Fax Lane : The Use of Facsimile Technology by State Courts, 
San Francisco, National Center for State Courts, 1990. 
107. Criminal Code, ss. 486(2.1) and (2.2). 
108. R. v. Squires (n° 1), (1985) 25 C.C.C. (3d) 32 (C.P. Ont.) ; R. v. Squires (n° 2), (1985) 
25 C.C.C. (3d) 44 (C.P. Ont.) ; R. v. Squires (1989), 69 C R . (3d) 337 (C. Dist. Ont.). The 
appeal by a former C.B.C. reporter for filming a witness leaving an Ottawa courtroom, 
was pleaded before the Ontario Court of Appeal on February 24, 1992. The court stated 
that it could rule on the ban on cameras in court buildings without ruling on the use of 
cameras in proceeding rooms. The decision has not been rendered yet. 
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A final example of the use of technology to aid the criminal justice 
process is the development of DNA fingerprinting. The use of biological 
science to identify the unique genetic code of a human being from samples 
of blood or other bodily fluids has increased immeasurably the accuracy 
and reliability of scientific identification techniques. DNA typing was first 
applied in Canada in 1989109. More recently, it was the cornerstone of the 
case against Allan Legere, the convicted suspect who escaped police 
custody and committed further murders while eluding captivity in New 
Brunswick. 
5. Conclusion 
The criminal law reform trends discussed above promote both fairness 
and efficiency, demonstrating that these two values need not be incom-
patible. As the Law Reform Commission stated in its recent Research 
Program : 
Greater fairness, efficiency and accessibility can be conflicting concepts if any one 
of these values is unduly promoted at the expense of others. There is a delicate 
balance to be achieved among these three complementary notions. In a time of 
financial restraint, where one has to do more with less, the pursuit of these 
objectives is more than challenging ; it has become an imperative110. 
A system is by definition a structure designed to accomplish some 
function with efficiency. The pursuit of justice may be defined as the 
pursuit of fair treatment. A justice system, by its very nature therefore, 
must seek to achieve both fairness and efficiency. To have either an 
inefficient system of justice or an efficient system which produces injustice 
is neither desirable nor acceptable. 
Recent trends in criminal law reform indicate that there is a growing 
awareness in the judicial, legislative and administrative branches of the 
need to pursue both fairness and efficiency simultaneously. The challenge 
is to strike a healthy balance between these two essential values. 
109. R. v. McNalfy, as reported in the article « DNA Fingerprinting », (1989) 8 The Lawyers 
Weekly 1. 
110. LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, New Research Program, unpublished docu-
ment, Ottawa, 1992, p. 8. 
